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Abstract:
There is growing evidence of systematic heterogeneity in behavior by observable characteristics,
such as what one would see in a face. We ask, is there informational value in knowing these
characteristics in a strategic interaction? Subjects are given the opportunity to purchase a
photograph of their partner in the play of a trust game. Not everyone purchases the photo, even at
prices as low as $0.20. Senders (first movers in the game) have a more inelastic demand for
pictures than responders (second movers). White senders have a substantially higher demand
than nonwhite senders or responders. For responders, there is no difference in demand for
pictures across ethnicity or sex. White senders who pay to see the picture of their partner use the
information to discriminate, sending significantly less to black responders than to white
responders. Overall, responders return a higher percentage of the amount received as offers go
up, but they do differentiate that percentage when they see the picture of the sender, returning
more to a member of the same ethnicity. A face, it appears, has strategic value, especially for
those who will use the information to differentiate their decisions.
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Introduction
Systematic heterogeneity in behavior can occur because people differ from each other, as when
women and men are shown to behave differently, or because people treat each other differently,
as when minorities are treated differently from whites. Recent research illustrates the second
source of heterogeneity by demonstrating that, when subjects are shown photos of their
counterparts, their decisions are affected by what they observe, such as ethnicity, sex, and
attractiveness.1 If a photograph contains valuable information, a person can use that information
to differentiate behavior. The fact that decisions vary based on the information in a photograph
indicates that subjects believe the information to be valuable. We conduct experiments to test
whether subjects are willing to pay for the information they infer from photos, and if that
information is worth its price. We ask, what is the informational value of a photo? And, how do
decisions change with that information?
We use a trust game similar to that of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1985) to explore these
questions. The game is ideal because it allows us to see the differential value of a photo in a
game of strategic play. In the game, a sender is paired with a responder, and both are endowed
with M tokens. The sender can send any number of tokens between 0 and M tokens to the
responder. Any amount sent is tripled, and the responder can return to the sender any amount
between zero and the tripled amount received. While the responder makes his decision knowing
the amount sent, the sender must decide how much to send without knowing how much will be
returned. The sender must form some expectation about how much the responder will return. A
player on one side of the interaction has to make a decision that is more strategic than the other.
Information should be more valuable to the more strategic player – the first mover. This allows
us to explore the effect of strategic value on the willingness to purchase information in the form
of a counterpart’s photograph and the effect of a photo on decisions.
The innovation in our experiments is that, before making decisions in the trust game, a subject is
allowed to purchase the picture of a partner for a predetermined price. If the picture is purchased,
the partner’s picture is displayed when the subject makes a decision in the subsequent trust game
with that counterpart. If the picture is not purchased, the partner’s identity is kept confidential.
This set-up allows us to estimate the demand for photos, quantify their value, and explore their
effect on decisions. Our data give the first empirical support for the value of a photo and the
differential desire to acquire this information. That people are willing to pay for this information
and use it strategically suggests that theory in such environments needs to take this into account.
Our interest is to investigate the informational value of a photograph in a trust game. Previous
research has shown that people are willing to pay for payoff-relevant information. In a public
goods game, Kurzban and Descoli (2008) show that subjects are willing to purchase information
on previous-round behavior at a small fixed cost, and they use that information to adjust
contributions. While information may hold value for payoffs, it may not be completely irrational
to observe individuals forgoing information in order to remain ignorant. There is a growing
1

For recent examples, see Andreoni and Petrie (2008), Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Burns (2005), Habyarimana, et
al. (2007), Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), Petrie (2004), Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), and Wilson and Eckel
(2006, 2007). Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003) and Greiner, Guth and Zultan (2005) use video instead of
photos.
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theoretical literature that suggests that people with time-inconsistent preferences may prefer to
avoid information-gathering to remain optimistic or delay costs (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000;
Amador, Werning and Angeletos, 2006; Brocas and Carrillo, 2004; Lagerlof, 2004). Also, there
is experimental evidence that, given the self-serving opportunity to remain ignorant or hide one’s
decisions behind bad luck, people take that option (Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2007; Dana, Cain
and Dawes, 2006; Castillo and Leo, 2007).
Several experimental studies show that knowing something about the characteristics of one’s
partner may have informational value. This holds for knowing the social context and specific
characteristics, such as sex, beauty and ethnicity.2 Also, experimental evidence shows that
strategic behavior is related to the sex of the decision maker and her counterpart.3 Specific to
trust games, several studies have shown that both sex and ethnicity can affect decisions. The
many studies that test for gender differences in trust the lab are surveyed in Garbarino and
Slonim (2007). For example, Buchan, Croson and Solnick (2006) find that men trust more than
women, and women are more trustworthy than men. Petrie (2004) finds that black men are the
least trusting of all groups, and people treat them as such. Burns (2005) and Wilson and Eckel
(2007) find that skin color is related to trust and reciprocity: darker skinned players trust less and
are less likely to be trusted, though they are no less trustworthy. Haile, Sadrieh and Verbon
(2006) find that income differences in South Africa, rather than race, explain trust behavior.
These studies suggest that knowledge of gender, ethnicity and other factors may be valuable in a
trust context.
In our experiments, as in previous research, we find important differentiation in trust decisions
by sex and ethnicity. We also are able to explore some of the underlying reasons why this might
be the case. Given the opportunity to buy the photograph of a partner, both senders and
responders do so. Senders, however, spend more money on buying photos than responders and
they have a more inelastic demand for photos. White senders have the highest demand for
photos. The value of seeing the photo appears to be mainly strategic. Indeed, if behavior is
correlated with personal characteristics, then seeing the photo should be helpful in forming
expectations about behavior. We would expect senders to be more likely to buy photos and use
that information to differentiate their trust.
Subjects that purchase photos tend to differentiate their decisions based on the ethnicity of their
partner. White senders send less to black responders, but black senders do not differentiate the
amount sent. This may be due to different expectations about the behavior of responders or an ingroup/out-group effect. On the responder side, both black and white responders tend to favor
partners of the same ethnicity and return a higher percentage to them relative to partners of
another ethnicity.

2

For the interaction of social context and outcomes, see Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Bohnet and Frey (1999a,
1999b), and Burnham (2003). For specific characteristics of a partner, such as sex, beauty and ethnicity, see
Andreoni and Petrie (2008), Castillo and Carter (2006), Castillo and Petrie (2007), Cox and Deck (2006), Ferraro
and Cummings (2007), Hammermesh and Biddle (1994), Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), and Wilson and Eckel
(2006, 2007).
3
See Croson and Gneezy (2008), Eckel and Grossman (1998, 2001, 2008), Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003),
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
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These results suggest that the informational value of a face is non-zero. In the realm of strategic
decisions, seeing the photograph of one’s partner may provide information to help form
expectations about behavior. It appears that this information is may be more valuable to some
groups than to others.

Experiment
Subjects are given the opportunity to purchase a picture of their partners before making decisions
in a trust game. The instructions for the trust game are read first. In the trust game, both the first
mover, the sender, and the second mover, the responder, are endowed with 10 tokens. Each token
is worth $1.50. The sender can send any number of tokens, from zero to ten, to the responder.
Each token sent to the responder is tripled. The responder can return any number of tokens, from
zero to the tripled amount, back to the sender. Subjects are paired with six different partners and
make their decisions simultaneously and without feedback.
Each subject makes six decisions with six different partners, each on a separate screen on a
computer. The subject can easily click back and forth through the screens to make decisions.
The sender decides how many tokens to send to the responder by moving a slide bar on each
decision screen. The computer clearly indicates how many tokens the sender would keep and
how many tripled tokens the responder receives. The responder makes decisions using the
strategy method, deciding how many tokens to send back to the sender for every possible number
of tokens received. Decisions are made using slider bars that represents the tripled amount
received for each possible choice that the sender could make. These choices are made on
successive screens for each sender the responder is matched with. Each subject submits his
decisions without knowing what his partner decided to do. One of the six decisions is chosen at
random for payment, and subjects know this ahead of time. Subjects are randomly assigned one
role, know their role before making any decisions and keep the same role for the entire
experiment.
Each subject has his photo taken at the beginning of the experimental session. The photo is taken
with a digital camera and is taken from the shoulders up so that the subject’s face is visible but
nothing else. The photo is similar to a passport or identification photo. After the trust-game
instructions but before making the trust decisions, subjects are asked if they are willing to give
up a fixed amount of money and see the photo of the person they are paired with for that
decision. The money the subject gives up is the price the subject pays for the seeing the photo.
For each partner that a subject is paired with, the subject sees a different price. The price
attached to each partner is randomly assigned, and subjects know this ahead of time. Subjects
must decide if they will take the money and not see the photo of their partner, or forego the
money and see the photo of their partner. In three sessions, prices were {$.50, $1, $2, $3, $4,
$5}, and in one session, prices were more extreme {$.20, $.50, $1, $2, $5, $8}. Both senders and
responders see the exact same prices. Once everyone decides which, if any, photos they wish to
see, subjects then make their trust decisions while observing the photos they purchased.
If a subject decides to pay the price to see the photo of one of his partners, the photo is displayed
on the top of the trust decision screen for the decision with that partner. Suppose a subject
decides to pay $0.50 to see a partner, $1.00 to see another partner and $2.00 to see another

3

partner. He decides not to pay the higher prices required to see any of the other three partners.
Then, on the decision screen for each partner whose photo he purchased, the subject sees the
partner’s photo. On the decision screen for each partner whose photo he did not purchase, the
subject does not see the partner’s photo. So, of the subject’s six partners, the subject sees three of
the six partners’ photos. The subject’s partner does not know if the subject bought his photo or
not. For whichever decision is randomly chosen for payment, if the subject decided not to see the
photo, then in addition to the money earned from the trust decision, the subject also receives the
photo money for that decision. If the subject decided to see the photo, he receives no extra
money.
A total of 84 subjects participated in four experimental sessions with either 20 or 22 subjects.
All sessions were conducted at the Experimental Economics Center (EXCEN) laboratory at
Georgia State University.4 Subjects were recruited from introductory courses in economics,
political science, sociology, biology and chemistry. Subjects were also recruited through flyers
posted on campus and through ads in the campus newspaper. Each experimental session took
about one hour and a half. Average total subject earnings are $30.48 (standard deviation $10.70).
Of the subjects in the experiments, 38.1% of subjects are men. Each subject was asked his
ethnicity. Of all subjects, 54.8% are self-described as Black or African American, 26.2% are
Caucasian or White, 19% are Other (including Arab, 1.2%, Asian, 3.6% Hispanic, 8.3%, Indian,
3.6%, Pakistani, 2.4%).5 We focus on the behavior of Whites and Blacks and group all other
ethnicities together.

Demand for Pictures
We first examine the demand for pictures. Given the opportunity, do people purchase the
photograph of their partner? Table 1 shows the percent of subjects who purchase a photo by the
price of the photo. Even at very low prices, not everyone purchases the photo. For example, even
at the lowest price, $0.20, only 50% of subjects purchase.6 As the price of the picture goes up,
the percent of subjects purchasing photos declines as expected.
Looking at senders and responders separately, the percent of subjects purchasing the photo is
slightly higher for senders, and the tails of the distribution are different. At the lowest price, there
are more responders than senders who purchase, and at the highest price, $8.00, only senders are
willing to pay to buy a picture. However, both a binomial proportions test and a chi-square test
for difference in distribution shows these differences are not significant (p-values = 0.476 and
0.514, respectively).

4

Georgia State University is a racially diverse urban campus in downtown Atlanta.
The distribution across race and sex in the experiment is slightly more biased towards black subjects compared to
the university population. Approximately, 37% of the undergraduate student body is White, 31% is Black, 10% is
Asian, 6% is Hispanic, 10% did not report their race, and 6% fall in miscellaneous categories.
6
Since estimating the demand for a good does not require observing demand at prices of zero, we opted not to offer
the picture for free. We consider the prices of $0.20 and $0.50 low enough compared to average earnings ($30.48) to
be close to a price of zero.
5

4

Senders pay more on average for pictures than responders. Totaling up what senders and
receivers pay to see the picture of their partners, senders pay on average $2.01 (std dev $4.65)
and responders pay on average $1.11 (std dev $2.76). While senders are paying on average $0.90
more than responders (almost twice as much), the difference is not significant.7

Table 1: Percent of subjects who purchase a photo, by price of the photo.*
(fraction in parentheses)
Price
Total
Sender
Responder
$.20
$.50
$1.00
$2.00
$3.00
$4.00
$5.00
$8.00
All

50.0
(10/20)
38.1
(32/84)
23.8
(20/84)
14.3
(12/84)
7.8
(5/64)
6.2
(4/64)
7.1
(6/84)
5.0
(1/20)
21.4
(90/420)

40.0
(4/10)
35.7
(15/42)
21.4
(9/42)
21.4
(9/42)
9.4
(3/32)
9.4
(3/32)
9.5
(4/42)
10.0
(1/10)
22.9
(48/210)

60.0
(6/10)
40.5
(17/42)
26.2
(11/42)
7.1
(3/42)
6.2
(2/32)
3.1
(1/32)
6.2
(2/32)
0.0
(0/10)
20.0
(42/210)

*Prices for sessions 1-3 were $.50, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5; for Session 4, they were $.20, $.50, $1, $2, $5, and $8.

We would like to know how the demand for buying the picture of one’s partner varies by sex,
ethnicity and role of the subject. Table 2 shows a random-effects linear probability model of
buying a picture as a function of the price of the picture, sex, ethnicity, role the subject was
assigned and interaction terms.8
Demand for pictures is downward sloping, and senders have a more inelastic demand than
responders. The former is reassuring and suggests that pictures are a normal good. The latter is
expected since the sender’s decision is more strategic than the responder’s. Because the
responder gives a conditional response, there is no uncertainty about the outcome after the sender
chooses how much to send. The sender, however, must decide how much to send given an
expectation about what the responder will choose.

7

A one-tail t-test has a p-value of 0.143, and a two-tail test has a p-value of 0.287. The p-value for a rank-sum test
for difference in means is 0.713.
8
These results also hold if we run the regression as OLS with clustered errors and as a Logit with random effects.
We report the results from the random-effects linear probability regression for ease of exposition.
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There is no difference in demand between men and women, but white senders have a higher
demand for pictures than any other group. At any price, a white sender would be 40% more
likely to buy a picture than any other sender.9
Table 2: Probability of Buying a Picture
Individual-Level Random Effects Regression
Probability of Buying
Price
Male
Black
White
Sender
Sender*Price
Sender*Male
Sender*Black
Sender*White
Constant
N
R2 – overall
Individual Random Effects

-0.066 (0.000)
0.061 (0.533)
-0.005 (0.967)
-0.139 (0.309)
-0.196 (0.214)
0.022 (0.071)
-0.072 (0.587)
0.166 (0.318)
0.384 (0.039)
0.365 (0.003)
504
0.12
Yes

*p-values in parentheses.

It could be that senders, and especially white senders, may have responded this way because of
the composition of the experimental session. Recall that a subject knew that he would be
partnered with someone else in the room. So, the probability of purchasing a photo may also be
affected by the likelihood of encountering a partner of a certain characteristic.10 If we add
session-level variables describing the composition of the room, such as percent of men, percent
of Whites, percent of Blacks, senders still have a more inelastic demand and white senders have
a higher demand. So, the composition of the room does not appear to be an explanation.
An alternative explanation is that because white subjects were always a minority in all sessions
(there were always more black subjects than white), they would be more likely to want to
identify others to see if their partner is in their own group or in an out group. The behavior of
white subjects is also consistent with unfamiliarity with other groups. Because Whites are the
majority in society, they may be less likely to interact with minority groups, whereas minority
groups are more likely to interact with majority groups. Majority group members are more likely
to be teachers in school or bosses in the workplace. Majority groups may be more interested in
finding out who they are paired with because of this unfamiliarity. We turn next to behavior of
senders to see if behavior changes conditional on viewing the photo.

9

This result also holds if we further disaggregate the ethnicity data into Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, and Others.
Castillo and Petrie (2007) also found that information is more valuable for Whites than any other group.
10
Subjects made their decisions at a computer with privacy dividers, but they saw one another as they entered the
lab and as photographs were taken.
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Amount sent
We have seen that senders are more likely to purchase a photo of their partners. We would also
like to know how the amount sent to the responder varied by the characteristics of the responder.
Table 3 shows the average amount sent by a sender to a responder when the responder’s ethnicity
or sex is known and when it is unknown.
Table 3: Average Number of Tokens Sent by Sender and Responder Ethnicity and Sex
Responder
Black
White
Other
Unknown
N
Sender
Black
1.5 (15)
3.1 (10)
2.5 (4)
1.9 (109)
138
White
3.6 (10)
5.5 (6)
.
4.1 (38)
54
Other
4 (2)
.
3 (1)
3.8 (57)
60

Male
Female

Male
3.9 (10)
2.5 (11)

Female
3.8 (8)
2.5 (19)

Unknown
2.8 (84)
2.9 (120)

N
102
150

* Number of observations in parentheses

The top section of Table 3 shows the amount sent by the ethnicity of the sender and the
responder. On average, Whites send 3.6 tokens to a known black responder and 5.5 tokens to a
known white responder. This difference is significant using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (p-value
= 0.083). Whites do not send significantly more or less on average to unknown partners than to
known white or black partners. Blacks send 1.5 tokens on average to a known black responder
and 3.1 tokens to a known white responder. These differences are not significant (p-value =
0.118). Other ethnic groups do not distinguish amounts sent.
The bottom section of Table 3 shows amount sent by sex of the sender and the responder. Men
send on average 3.8 tokens to known partners, and women send 2.5 tokens to known partners.
Neither men nor women significantly differentiate the amount sent to men or women.
Do the results in Table 3 hold up when controlling for both ethnicity and sex? Table 4 shows
individual-level random effects regression results for the amount sent by senders controlling for
the ethnicity and sex of the sender, the ethnicity of the pairing and session fixed effects.11 The
omitted pairing category is when the partner’s picture is not shown or when the partner’s picture
is shown and the partner is not Black or White. The same results hold if pairing dummies are
included such that the only omitted category is unknown partners. As the raw averages in Table
3 indicate, white senders send significantly less to known black responders. Comparing the
coefficients in the regression in Table 4, they send 1.83 tokens less to a black than to a white
responder. Black senders also send more to known white responders compared to known black
responders, but this difference is not significant. The only other significant effect is that Blacks
send 1.5 tokens less on average.

11

These results also hold if we run the regression as a random-effects Tobit.
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Table 4: Amount Sent
Individual-Level Random Effects Regressions
Amount Sent
Male Sender
Black Sender
White Sender
Black Sender-Black Responder
Black Sender-White Responder
White Sender-White Responder
White Sender-Black Responder
Constant
N
R2 – overall
Individual Random Effects
Session Fixed Effects

0.423 (0.540)
-1.542 (0.081)
0.907 (0.401)
0.168 (0.754)
0.665 (0.210)
0.438 (0.650)
-1.392 (0.091)
4.341 (0.000)
252
0.24
Yes
Yes

*p-values in parentheses.

These results also hold if we include dummy variables for the pairings by sex of the sender and
the responder. Whites still send significantly less to known black partners, and the effect is a
little stronger. In addition, as the raw averages in Table 3 suggest, men send 1.3 tokens more to
their known partners, be they men or women, relative to unknown partners and to female
senders. Only in male-male pairings, however, is this difference significant.
It appears that not only do white senders have a higher demand for seeing who they are paired
with, but they also use that information to significantly differentiate the amount sent to white and
black responders. This might be due to different expectations about the behavior of responders.
For instance, white subjects might anticipate that the percent returned might differ depending on
the race of the responder. Black subjects also seem to anticipate this, but the difference in the
regression is not significant.
Behavior by black and white subjects also differs in overall variability, with whites engaging in
more differentiation than blacks. On average, black subjects send less, whether or not they see
their partner.12 They also have a lower variance in behavior than white subjects. If there is little
differentiation in trust behavior in general, then we should not expect to see any differentiation
when the partner is seen. Also, there is little reason for black subjects to purchase photographs.
We turn next to the behavior of responders for some clues.
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One explanation for why Blacks send less might come from sociological theories of racial differences in group
positioning. For example, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) find that Blacks and Latinos are more likely to see other
groups as competitive threats for scarce resources, whereas Whites are less likely to hold such views. The sender in
the Trust game has to trust that responders will share the invested pie. This could be viewed as competition over
scarce resources.
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Percent returned
How does the percent returned by responders, conditional on amount sent, vary with the
characteristics of the sender? Table 5 shows how responders react to the amount sent. We define
a response function as the percent returned for each amount sent by the sender. In Table 5, we
also control for the responder’s characteristics and the sender’s characteristics. The dependent
variable is the percent returned of the tripled amount sent. We include dummy variables for the
type of pairing by ethnicity and interaction terms with amount sent.
Table 5: Percent Returned by Responders
Individual-Level Random Effects Regression
Percent Returned
Amount sent
Male Responder
Black Responder
White Responder
Black Responder-Black Sender
Black Responder-White Sender
White Responder-White Sender
White Responder-Black Sender
Male Responder*amount sent
Black Responder*amount sent
White Responder*amount sent
Black Responder-Black Sender*amount sent
Black Responder-White Sender*amount sent
White Responder-White Sender*amount sent
White Responder-Black Sender*amount sent
Constant
N
R2 – overall
Individual Random Effects
Session Fixed Effects

0.821 (0.000)
1.481 (0.809)
3.392 (0.670)
-6.776 (0.433)
9.205 (0.000)
13.971 (0.000)
6.257 (0.277)
8.424 (0.027)
0.962 (0.000)
-1.102 (0.000)
-0.532 (0.041)
-0.824 (0.032)
-1.939 (0.000)
2.022 (0.026)
0.939 (0.113)
20.647 (0.019)
2520
0.12
yes
yes

*p-values in parentheses.

As we would expect, and consistent with previous studies, the response function is upward
sloping. Higher amounts sent yield a higher percentage returned. A sender who sent one token
would get 21.4% back, but a sender who sent 10 tokens would get 28.8% returned. The response
function of responders, however, is not upward sloping for everyone. Blacks, and especially
black women, have a downward sloping response function, so that higher offers get a smaller
percentage returned. The response function of all other groups is upward sloping with white men
having the steepest slope.
These types of response functions suggest that a money-maximizing sender should, in general,
send less to a black responder and more to a white responder. We see that white senders do
exactly that. They send less to black responders. Black senders, however, do not significantly
9

differentiate the amount sent based on the characteristics of the responder. In this sense, black
senders are not payoff-maximizing. Either black senders did not anticipate this difference in
behavior by white and black responders or there is a slight in-group bias with black senders
sending more to black responders.
When we consider the effect of seeing the picture of the sender on the response function, we see
an effect on both the intercept and slope. Seeing the picture of one’s partner does increase the
percentage returned for any offer compared to not seeing the picture, so there does appear to be
some gain to senders for having their picture shown (though we did not elicit willingness to pay
to have one’s picture revealed).
We are also interested in how the slope of the response function changes depending on the
pairing. Figure 1 shows a graph of the response functions of different ethnic pairings. (In the key
below, the first entry is the responder, and the second the sender – i.e., White-Black is white
responder returning money to a black sender). In general, the response functions of black
responders are downward sloping and those of whites are upward sloping. For responders paired
with a sender of a different ethnicity, however, the slope of the function pivots downward. This
means that for higher offers, a white responder paired with a black sender will return a smaller
percentage than to a white sender. Also, a black responder paired with a white sender will return
a smaller percentage at higher offers than to a black sender. This result is consistent with ingroup bias favoring pairings of the same race at higher amounts sent.
Responder Behavior
60.0

Percent Returned

50.0

40.0
Black-Black Pairing
Black-White Pairing
White-White Pairing
White-Black Pairing

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Amount Sent

Figure 1: Percent Returned by Ethnicity of Pairing
The results in Table 5 are also robust to other specifications. If we add dummy variables on sex
pairings and interactions with amount sent, we get the same results on ethnicity. It appears that it
is women, rather than men, who are generating the downward-sloping reaction functions for
blacks.
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Decision Profits
Did those subjects who bought pictures make more money? Overall, senders and receivers made
more money for decisions where a photo was purchased, but the difference is not significant.
For senders, profits (earnings from the decision minus the cost of the picture) for decisions when
they bought a picture and could see the responder were 7.4% ($0.98) higher than for those
decisions where they did not buy a picture. For responders, profits for decisions when they
bought a picture and could see the sender were 11.3% ($2.77) higher than for those decisions
where they could not see their partner. Fixed-effects regressions of profits on a dummy for
having bought the picture for senders and for responders did not yield significantly different
results (p-value of 0.147 for responders and 0.292 for senders).
For white senders, however, profits are 38.6% ($5.10) higher compared to those senders who did
not buy a picture. This is significant (p-value of 0.041). There is no significant effect for sex, and
there is no significant effect for sex or race for responders. It seems that the information in a
picture has monetary value, especially to white senders.

Conclusions
In this research, we ask the following questions. What is the information value of a face in
decisions where there are returns to trust? And, how does this affect decisions? In addition, we
are able to see if subjects should purchase access to a partner’s photo by examining differences
in behavior and earnings based on knowledge of the counterpart’s photo. We use a trust game
with the option to purchase the photograph of one’s partner to examine these questions. Subjects
can purchase a photograph for a fixed price, and if a subject purchases the picture of his partner,
the subject sees the picture when making his decision. If a subject does not purchase the picture,
then the decision is strictly confidential.
There are four key findings. First, subjects will pay to see the picture of their counterparts,
especially for strategic decisions. Both senders and responders are willing to buy pictures,
although not everyone buys pictures, even at low prices. Senders have a more inelastic demand
for pictures than responders. This seems reasonable since their decision entails more uncertainty
than that of a responder. White senders have a higher demand for buying pictures than any other
group of senders. This might be due to a minority effect, as the percent of white subjects is
smaller than black subjects in all sessions. It is also consistent with unfamiliarity with minority
groups and, therefore, uncertainty about the expected behavior of a group of potential partners
consisting of members of minority groups.
Second, some senders use ethnicity to differentiate their trust. On average, black senders send
less than any other type of sender. However, they do not differentiate the amount sent to black
responders or white responders. White senders do differentiate the amount sent. They send more
to white responders than to black responders.
Third, responders tend to reward higher amounts sent, though some respond in the opposite way.
On average, as has been found in previous research, the percent returned to the sender by the
responder increases as the amount sent increases. Black responders, however, return an
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increasingly smaller percentage of the tripled amount as the amount sent increases. Indeed, the
percent returned of the amount sent of black responders paired with a white sender are the most
steeply and negatively sloped. Given these response functions, a money-maximizing sender
would do best by sending a black responder less money and a white responder more money. That
white senders do differentiate their trust but black senders do not is consistent with an in-group
hypothesis and incorrect beliefs on the behavior of responders.
Fourth, buying the picture of one’s partner increases profits for senders and receivers, but not
significantly. The only group for which buying pictures increase profits significantly is for
Whites. They earn 39% more than those who do not buy pictures. Pictures have informational
value to Whites and they use it to earn more money.
As shown in previous research, people do take physical cues, such as ethnicity and sex, to
differentiate their trust and trustworthiness. Our results show that this information has value in
strategic decisions and people are willing to pay for this information. Why might this be the
case? If behavior is correlated with ethnicity or sex, then knowing this information can be useful
in forming expectations. However, if behavior is uncorrelated with ethnicity or sex, then this
information may lead to incorrect expectations and suboptimal decisions. Also, it may perpetuate
bad equilibria where groups act a certain way because others expect them to.
That a face has value in strategic decisions has two sides. On the one hand, absent information
on performance, being able to see who one is dealing with may increase efficiency as one could
infer potential performance from the face. On the other hand, one could make incorrect
inferences and perpetuate self-fulfilling expectations. The challenge to researchers is to tease
apart how people use the information in a face to formulate decisions.
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